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Unlawful
Linking:
First
Difficulties in Cyberspace

Amendment

Doctrinal

Mark Deffner*
Recent cases, legislative bills, and enacted laws have made
determining what First Amendment protection exists for
1
hyperlinking an important issue. In Universal City Studios v.
Reimerdes, the website 2600.com was enjoined from providing
hyperlinks to websites that post computer code capable of
cracking Content Scramble System (CSS), the encryption
2
system which prevents DVD disks from being copied. The
“Methamphetamine Anti-Proliferation Act of 1999” would have
banned hyperlinks to websites which contain instructions on
3
Also, 18 USC § 842,
how to produce methamphetamine.
* J.D. candidate, University of Minnesota, 2002. B.S. Biochemistry,
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1996. M.S. Biotechnology, Northwestern
University, 1998. The author wishes to thank the staff and editors of MIPR
for their assistance in writing and editing this article.
1. Hyperlinks are elements of Web documents that allow users to move
from one document to other referenced documents. As opposed to typing in a
URL (Universal Resource Locator) address to cause the Web browser to
download another document, hyperlinks allow easy access to other documents
through a single mouse click. The hyperlinks may point to another place on
the same Web page, another Web page on the same Web site, or most
frequently to a different Web site entirely. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown,
Recent Linking Issues, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 8, 2000, at 3. The idea for hyperlinks
was developed at the European Laboratory for Particle Physics (CERN) in
Geneva. KLAUS W. GREWLICH, GOVERNANCE IN ‘CYBERSPACE’ ACCESS AND
PUBLIC INTEREST IN GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS 39 (1999).
2. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d. 346, 347
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
3. Criminal Prohibition on Distribution of Certain Information Relating
to the Manufacture of Controlled Substances, H.R. 2987, 106th Cong. (1999), §
5. Section 5 would make it unlawful to
teach or demonstrate to any person the manufacture of a controlled
substance, or to distribute to any person, by any means, information
pertaining to, in whole or in part, the manufacture or use of a
controlled substance, knowing that such person intends to use the
teaching, demonstration, or information for, or in furtherance of, an
activity that constitutes a Federal crime.
Id. at §5 (a). The potential First Amendment implication of this proposed
legislation was not lost on House Judiciary Committee members.
Representative Bob Barr, R-Ga., said that the bill would “codif[y] in the
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written in substantially the same language as the
4
Methamphetamine Anti-Proliferation Act of 1999, bans inter
alia hyperlinks to websites that contain information on making
5
explosives. Finally, the “Digital Millenium Copyright Act”
provides liability when an online service provider (“OSP”)
provides links to an online location containing infringing
6
material if certain safe harbor provisions are not met.
The ability to create a hyperlink from one website to
another “can be seen as one of the Internet’s most
7
distinguishing and valuable features.” Thus, hyperlinks are a
key component to what has been termed “a perfect means for
8
freely expressing one’s opinion.” As with the regulation of any
type of expression, the regulation of hyperlinking is subject to

criminal code for the first time a restriction on free speech in this country.”
David Hess, Committee Markups and Votes, July 25, 2000, NATIONAL
JOURNAL GROUP, INC., July 25, 2000. Represenative Tammy Baldwin, D-Wis.,
said that the bill would “cast the net too widely and intrud[e] on First
Amendment rights.” Id. Subsequently, a bipartisan amendment was adopted
by a 15-12 vote to delete that provision of the bill. See id. As of September, 21
2000, that bill was dropped entirely. See 146 CONG. REC. H7990.
4. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
5. See 18 USC § 842 (p). Hyperlinks to sites that contain instructions on
how to make explosives would be banned to the extent that they constitute
teaching or demonstrating to a person with knowledge that such person
intends to use the information for, or in furtherance of, a Federal crime. See
id.
6. See 17 USC § 512(d). There is no liability if the service provider:
(1) (A) does not have actual knowledge that the material or activity
is infringing;
(B) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(C) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously
to remove, or disable access to, the material;
(2) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the
right and ability to control such activity; and
(3) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in
subsection (c)(3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access
to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject
of infringing activity, except that, for purposes of this paragraph,
the information described in subsection (c)(3)(A)(iii) shall be
identification of the reference or link, to material or activity claimed
to be infringing, that is to be removed or access to which is to be
disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service
provider to locate that reference or link.
Id.
7. Raysman, supra note 1, at 3.
8. GREWLICH, supra note 1, at 267.
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9

First Amendment limitations. However, the extent to which
the First Amendment protects hyperlinking, and thus what
standard of judicial scrutiny should be applied, is not yet clear.
This Note critically discusses how the courts have thus far
applied the First Amendment in determining the
constitutionality of restrictions on hyperlinks. Part I discusses
the Internet as a new communications medium and describes
current First Amendment doctrine. Part II analyzes the
appropriateness of classifying hyperlinks as expressive conduct
for the purposes of First Amendment analysis.
This Note proposes that the non-speech elements of
hyperlinks are not significant enough to qualify as expressive
conduct and therefore that the courts have erred in holding to
the contrary. Further, it is a serious error not to distinguish
between software source code and hyperlinks. Ultimately, the
courts must be careful when deciding “just what the First
Amendment should mean in cyberspace” so that they don’t “get
10
it fundamentally wrong.”
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE INTERNET
1.

Development of a New Medium

The Internet began life in 1969 as ARPANET, a project of
11
the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA). This project
was initiated as a solution to the perceived vulnerability of
12
telecommunications networks in the event of armed conflict.
ARPANET was designed to enable computers operated by the
military, defense contractors, and universities conducting
9. See Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 326
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that computer code, specifically HTML code which
makes up most web pages and hyperlinks, is expression and therefore
regulation of it is subject to First Amendment doctrine and analysis).
10. JEREMY HARRIS LIPSCHULTZ, FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF THE
INTERNET 2 (2000) (quoting Supreme Justice David Souter who in 1997 said,
“In my ignorance, I have to accept the possibility that if we had to decide today
just what the First Amendment should mean in cyberspace, we would get it
fundamentally wrong.”).
11. See Guy Basque, Introduction to the Internet, THE ELECTRONIC
SUPERHIGHWAY THE SHAPE OF TECHNOLOGY AND LAW TO COME 7, 8 (Ejan
Mackaay et al. eds., 1995).
12. See id.
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defense-related research to communicate with one another
through redundant channels even if some portions of the
13
network were damaged during a war.
In 1984, the National Science Foundation (NSF) took over
control of the ARPANET network with the goal of expanding it
to include all university institutions and research
14
organizations. In 1988, the NSF began to open network links
15
to foreign countries, starting with Canada. In time, further
opening of the network led to the structure in place today, a
16
network of networks that transcends all national boundaries.
17
Today, access to the Internet is widespread. Individuals
18
can obtain access to the Internet from many different sources.
“Most colleges and universities provide access for their
students and faculty; many corporations provide their
employees with access through an office network; many
communities and local libraries provide free access”; access is
also available commercially through a number of major access
providers such as America Online, CompuServe, the Microsoft
19
Network, and Prodigy.
2. The World Wide Web & Hyperlinking
The World Wide Web ("the Web") refers to an extensive
amount of digital-information that is distributed among servers
20
interconnected by the Internet. This stored information is
largely in the form of hypertext documents (or "Web pages"),

13. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997).
14. See Basque, supra note 11, at 9.
15. See id.
16. See GREWLICH, supra note 1, at 38-39.
17. A GAO report issued in March of 1999 estimated that there were 153
million Internet users worldwide. See Securities Fraud On The Internet:
Hearings Before The Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations Of The
Committee On Governmental Affairs United States Senate, 106th Cong. 3
(1999) (statement of Richard J. Hillman, Associate Director, Financial
Institutions and Markets Issues General Government Division of GAO). A
Department of Commerce report issued in October 2000 found that 41.5% of
US households had Internet access. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
FALLING THROUGH THE NET: TOWARD DIGITAL INCLUSION XV 1 (2000). The
same report found there were 116.5 million Americans online as of August
2000. See id. at 51.
18. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 850.
19. See id.
20. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21782, at
*9 (D.D.C. 1999).
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which are generally a combination of text and graphics but can
also include audio and video content, programs, and other types
21
of data.
Most hypertext documents contain annotated references,
22
known as hyperlinks, to other Web pages. Hyperlinks can be
thought of as “analogous to using a library’s card index to get
reference to particular items, albeit faster and more
23
efficiently.” Clicking on a hyperlink establishes a connection
with the server of the linked site encouraging open, easy and
24
seamless access from one Web site to another. Hyperlinks can
be more than links between different sites; they can also be
used as cross-references within a single document or between
25
documents on the same site.
The Web is comparable, from the users’ viewpoint, to both
26
a vast library and a sprawling mall. Uniquely, any person or
organization with a computer connected to the Internet can
27
publish information. “Web publishing is simple enough that
thousands of individual users and small community
organizations are using the Web to publish their own personal
‘home pages’, the equivalent of individualized newsletters
about the person or organization, which are available to
28
everyone else on the Web.” Therefore, because of ease of use

21. See id. at 9-10.
22. See id. at 10. The court suggested that the expressive nature of
hyperlinks, which are no longer confined to the medium of hypertext web
pages. Hyperlinks can now be inserted in word processing documents as well
as e-mail messages. See Microsoft Corporation, Turn Text into a Hyperlink in
an Outlook 2000 HTML Message, <http://office.microsoft.com/assistance/
2000/olhtmlhyperlinks.aspx>. If you find an interesting Web site, news group,
file, or other information you want someone to see, you can insert a hyperlink
to its location. This saves you from typing a long description about the
information or typing instructions to the e-mail recipient on how to get to the
site. Id.
23. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553,
at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
24. See Raysman, supra note 1, at 3. Hyperlinks in a web page, most
commonly in the form of highlighted words and images, are imbedded with
three pieces of information: the address of the “server,” the computer that
stores documents, the document’s address on the server, and the protocol,
which is the language another computer must use to retrieve the document.
See John Markoff, A Free And Simple Computer Link, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1993, at D1.
25. See Microsoft, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21782, at *10.
26. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997).
27. See id.
28. Id. at 853 n.9.
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and breadth of potential readership, the Web may be regarded
29
as a perfect means for freely expressing one’s opinion.
3. Different Types of Hyperlinks
Since there are actually many different types of electronic
links that come under the definition of “hyperlink,” it is
necessary to specify what type will be referred to in this article.
The most basic type of link used in web pages is a simple cross30
reference between documents on different sites. This is the
type of hyperlink referred to in this article for analysis. This
distinction is critical because different sorts of issues may apply
to different sorts of hyperlinks, frustrating a First Amendment
31
analysis.
Beyond the most basic type of hyperlink, there is a linking
technique known as framing. Framing allows a browser
window to be divided so that multiple Web pages can be shown
simultaneously. This technique is commonly used to provide
an index to a web site along the border of the screen that
remains in place while the user browses through the pages of a
site. However, this type of link has questionable uses such as
displaying the informative content of one website while
displaying the advertising content or identifying marks of
32
another.
29. See GREWLICH, supra note 1, at 267.
30. See Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 307
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). “[T]he simplest link acts merely as an automated directory—
when the hypertext link is clicked with the mouse, the connection to the page
with the link is dropped and the user’s computer then connects with the linked
site, without further connection with the original page.” INTERACTIVE SERV.
SUBCOMM., ABA, WEB-LINKING AGREEMENTS: CONTRACTING STRATEGIES AND
MODEL PROVISIONS 1-2 (1997).
31. See Brian D. Wassom, Note, Copyright Implications of
“Unconventional Linking” on the World Wide Web: Framing, Deep Linking and
Inlining, 49 CASE W. RES. 181, 186 (1998) (evaluating online copyright law as
it applies to methods of integrating others’ information into Web pages such as
framing, deep linking, and inlining). Beyond copyright implications of linking,
other potential grounds for liability have been suggested, including trademark
infringement, trademark dilution, unfair competition, libel, and
misappropriation. See Mark Sableman, Link Law: The Emerging Law of
Internet Hyperlinks, 4 COMM. L. & POL’Y 557, 561-66 (1999).
32. See Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied Anagramics, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2265, 3 (C.D. Cal. 1998). In Futuredontics, the plaintiff operated a dental
referral business and maintained a web site with web pages containing
copyrightable subject matter. See id. The defendant maintained its own web
site and using a frame displayed content from the plaintiff’s web site
surrounded by the defendant’s logo and information. See Id.
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There is also a type of hyperlink known as deep linking.
In deep linking, a link is directed to a specific web page deep
34
within another website. By clicking on a deep link the user is
taken past the “front door” or home page of a website and taken
directly to specific content bypassing the second site’s
35
navigational structure.
36
Finally, there is a type of linking known as inlining.
Inlining refers to the use of graphic or text images in a website
that are actually being taken from another website in a
37
seamless manner. The only way the user would know that
these images are “borrowed” would be to examine the code
38
underlying the link.
4. Distinctions Between Posting Information and Linking To
Information
It is important to note the distinctions between
hyperlinking to content and posting content directly. A
hyperlink can be thought of as an “annotated reference”, that
describes to the web browser where information of a particular
39
nature can be found.
When a hyperlink is clicked on, the
user’s web browser requests information from the referenced
40
server, generally elsewhere on the Internet.
Thus, the
33. See Ticketmaster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *3.
34. See id. at 4. By clicking on a link from the website of Tickets.com, a
potential customer was transferred to an interior web page of Ticketmaster,
thus bypassing the home page for Ticketmaster. See id. at *3-4.
35. See id.
36. See Allison Roarty, Note, Link Liability: The Argument for Inline
Links and Frames as Infringements of the Copyright Display Right, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1011, 1017 (1999).
37. See id. “The image or text that is linked to is then brought into and
displayed on the linking Web page as though it is part of that Web page.” Id.
38. See id.
39. See Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 307
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). Hypertext has been referred to as “an electrified table of
contents” and “steroid-addled footnotes.” STEVEN JOHNSON, INTERFACE
CULTURE 133 (1997). “[T]he hypertext link is in essence an automated version
of a scholarly footnote or bibliographic reference: it tells the reader where to
find the referenced material.” Dan L. Burk, Proprietary Rights in Hypertext
Linkages, 2 J. OF INFO., L. AND TECH., ¶ 9 (1998), <http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/
intprop/98_2burk/>.
40. “Links are generally interconnections to ‘elsewhere,’ and to other
pages.” Rob Shields, Hypertext Links: The Ethic of the Index and Its SpaceTime Effects, in THE WORLD WIDE WEB AND CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL
THEORY 145, 150 (Andrew Herman & Thomas Swiss eds. 2000).
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information downloaded generally does not come from the
originating site of the hyperlink but rather comes from another
41
server location on the Internet.
This process can be
analogized to asking a question and instead of actually getting
an answer merely getting a suggestion of where to find the
42
Therefore, one website is actually providing the
answer.
information and the other is simply pointing out the location of
43
the providing website.
This distinction is important in the context of this article.
While it may be a difficult Constitutional matter to decide
whether or not certain expression can be posted on the
Internet, it is a dramatically more difficult Constitutional
undertaking to decide whether or not the location of this
information can be described in the form of a hyperlink.
B. FIRST AMENDMENT RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH REGULATION
The essential idea of freedom of speech can be described in
words attributed to Voltaire: “I disapprove of what you say, but
44
I will defend to the death your right to say it.” This concept
was considered to be so important by our Founding Fathers
that it was incorporated into the Constitution through the First
45
Amendment.
46
Yet, freedom of speech in our society is not absolute and
41. It is possible to have a hypertext link that connects to its own page but
these circular links are not the type of hypertext link being discussed.
42. For example, if someone asked what the word "alacrity" meant it
might be appropriate to refer him to the dictionary.
43. When a hypertext link is called or clicked upon, the browser takes the
file name of the web page and translates this into machine code and thereby
invokes other web page content. See Shields, supra note 40, at 153.
44. S. G. TALLENTYRE, THE FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE 199 (1907). “The
essence of that comment has been repeated time after time in our decisions
invalidating attempts by the government to impose selective controls upon the
dissemination of ideas.” Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63. But see
JACQUES BARZUN, FROM DAWN TO DECADENCE 361 (2000) (doubting that
Voltaire ever actually wrote these words).
45. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The
precise justification for why this sort of right is valuable is the subject of
multiple lines of thought including: search for truth, individual autonomy,
democracy and self-government, and tolerance. See generally WOJCIECH
SADURSKI, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ITS LIMITS 7-35 (1999).
46. The idea that there can be liability based on speech is an old one.
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to insist that all types of speech be treated equally would be
“both patently absurd and inimical to the freedom of really
47
valuable speech.” Accordingly, the First Amendment does not
48
protect some types of speech.
Further, there are varying
degrees of protection among the types that are protected. The
justification for allowing some suppression of speech is always
49
based on harms avoided by such suppression and is never
based upon dislike for the particular speech. The Supreme
Court has said that “the fact that society may find speech
50
offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.”
Consistent with the ideas above, judicial precedent has
resulted in defined doctrinal categories of expression and
51
accompanying tests for the application of judicial scrutiny.
Through the relevant test, the court seeks to balance the value
of free speech with the potential harm of that particular type of
speech. Those doctrinal free speech categories most relevant
when analyzing the regulation of hyperlinks, and thus
reviewed here, include expressive conduct, prior restraint,
advocating unlawful conduct, and content based versus noncontent based restrictions.
1. Expressive Conduct
The seminal case for expressive conduct doctrine is United
52
States v. O’Brien. In O’Brien, protestors of the Vietnam War
were expressing themselves by burning their Selective Service
registration certificates on the steps of the South Boston
53
David O’Brien was then tried, convicted, and
Courthouse.
“Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases
before the public . . . but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or
illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity.” 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 151-52 (1769).
47. SADURSKI, supra note 45, at 37.
48. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (providing that
“[t]he First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance”).
49. See SADURSKI, supra note 45, at 38.
50. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (Stevens, J., dictum).
This idea has been shown by holdings in instances such as when the city of
Skokie, Illinois, tried to stop the Nazi party from marching and the 7th Circuit
held that the Nazis had a right to march. See generally Collin v. Smith, 578
F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
51. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294,
326 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
52. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
53. See id. at 369.
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sentenced for knowing destruction of a Selective Service
registration certificate under the Universal Military Training
54
and Service Act of 1948. The Supreme Court held that “when
‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
55
In
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”
upholding the conviction of O’Brien, the Court elaborated a
three part test for evaluating regulations limiting expressive
conduct: the regulation must further an important or
substantial governmental interest, the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the
incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms must be no
56
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
More recently, this doctrine has been applied to evaluating
the constitutionality of laws proscribing the burning of the
57
United States flag. In United States v. Eichman, people were
arrested for violation of the Flag Protection Act of 1989 after
burning a United States flag on the steps of the United States
58
Capitol. After the government conceded that the flag burning
59
constituted expressive conduct, the Court held that the
statute failed the three part O’Brien test because the restriction
60
on speech was directly related to the message. Accordingly,
the statute was subject to “the most exacting scrutiny” and
61
found unconstitutional. The Court concluded by stating that
“[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the

54. See id. at 369-70. As amended in 1965, the act provided that one “who
forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner
changes any such certificate” commits an offense. See id. at 370 (italics
omitted).
55. Id. at 376.
56. See id. at 377.
57. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
58. See id. at 312. The Act provided in relevant part that “(a)(1) Whoever
knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor
or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 700
(2000).
59. See id. at 315.
60. See id. at 313-16. “[T]he Government’s desire to preserve the flag as a
symbol for certain national ideals is implicated ‘only when a person’s
treatment of the flag communicates [a] message’ to others that is inconsistent
with those ideals.” Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 318 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
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expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
62
itself offensive or disagreeable.”
This doctrine has also been applied to evaluating the
constitutionality of laws that regulate the distribution of
computer source code. In Junger v. Daley, the Sixth Circuit
held that the O’Brien test was applicable for laws regulating
the source code of an encryption program because source code
63
In Junger, a
has both functional and expressive features.
professor challenged on Constitutional grounds the provisions
of the Export Administration Regulations that regulate the
64
These regulations prevented
export of encryption software.
him from publishing without a license encryption source code
65
on his web site in support of his teaching activities.
In
analogizing computer source code to a musical score, the court
held that although computer code is unintelligible to many and
not traditional speech, it is an expressive means for the
exchange of information and ideas about computer
programming and therefore protected by the First
66
The court further held that “[t]he functional
Amendment.
capabilities of source code, and particularly those of encryption
source code, should be considered when analyzing the
governmental interest in regulating the exchange of this form
67
of speech.”
2. Prior Restraint
Concisely,
the
term
prior
restraint
refers
to
“administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain
communications when issued in advance of the time that such
68
communication are to occur.” The prototypical forms of prior
restraint are court injunctions stopping speech and required
69
licensing of certain types of speech.
Near v. Minnesota was a classic example of the doctrine of

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 319 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
See Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 483-84.
See id.
See id. at 484-85.
Id. at 485.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 773 (1997) (quoting Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766,
2771 (1993)).
69. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 68, at 770.
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70

prior restraint. In Near, a Minnesota law provided “for the
abatement, as a public nuisance, of a malicious, scandalous and
71
defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical.” Under
the statute, a trial court enjoined a publication, known for
criticizing public officials, from publishing or circulating “any
publication . . . whatsoever containing malicious, scandalous
72
and defamatory matter.” The Supreme Court held that the
injunction was unconstitutional and that, “it has been
generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief
purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon
publication” and that there is a “deep-seated conviction that
73
such restraints would violate constitutional right.”
3. Advocating Unlawful Conduct
The seminal case defining First Amendment protection of
speech that advocates unlawful conduct is Brandenburg v.
74
Ohio.
In Brandenburg, a KKK leader was prosecuted
75
pursuant to the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute for
comments made during a rally that were captured on film by a
76
news cameraman. The Supreme Court held that a restriction
could be made on expression that advocates unlawful conduct
without facing strict scrutiny provided that: imminent harm
was threatened, there was a likelihood of the expression
actually producing illegal action, and that there was an intent
77
on the part of the speaker to cause imminent illegality.
However, the Court held that the abstract teaching of the
moral propriety or moral necessity of force and violence was
“not the same as preparing a group for violent action and
78
steeling it to such action.” In this instance, the Ohio Criminal

70. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
71. Id. at 701-02 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Id. at 705 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at 713, 718, 723.
74. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
75. See id. at 445 (referencing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.13).
76. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445-46. Relevant to inciting illegal
conduct, the speaker stated that “[w]e’re not a revengent organization, but if
our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the
white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some
revengeance taken.” Id. at 446.
77. See id. at 447.
78. Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98
(1961)).
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Syndicalism Statute did not distinguish between mere
advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless action and was
79
therefore held unconstitutional.
In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, the Fourth Circuit held that
the First Amendment does not bar a publisher from being held
80
civilly liable as an aider and abetter to an act of homocide.
Paladin Enterprises was the publisher of a book that served as
81
an instructional manual for would-be contract killers. A man
purchased the book and carefully followed its instructions
82
subsequently murdering three people. Speaking to the First
Amendment interests involved, the Fourth Circuit cited
Brandenburg and acknowledged that paradoxically a right to
advocate lawlessness is one of the greatest safeguards of
83
liberty. The court held that,
[e]ven in a society of laws, one of the most indispensable freedoms
is that to express in the most impassioned terms the most
passionate disagreement with the laws themselves, the institutions
of, and created by, law, and the individual officials with whom the
laws and institutions are entrusted. Without the freedom to
84
criticize that which constrains, there is no freedom at all.

However, the Fourth Circuit ultimately reversed the
district court because regardless of the right to express
disagreement with the laws, “it is equally well established that
speech, which, in its effect, is tantamount to legitimately
proscribable nonexpressive conduct may itself be legitimately
proscribed, punished, or regulated incidentally to the
85
constitutional enforcement of generally applicable statutes.”
In this case the court found that the conduct of the publisher
was more than just abstract advocacy and reached the level of
86
civil aiding and abetting of a contract murder.

79. See id. at 448-49.
80. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997).
81. See id. at 241. The book was entitled, Hit Man: A Technical Manual
for Independent Contractors. Id. at 239. It contained 130 pages of detailed
factual instructions on how to murder and to become a professional killer. See
id. The book included advice so potentially dangerous that the court felt it
necessary to omit portions of illustrative passages from its opinion in order to
minimize the danger to the public from their repetition. See id. at 239 n.1.
82. See id. at 239.
83. See id. at 243.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id.
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4. Content Related Versus Non-Content Related Restrictions
The distinction between content-based and content-neutral
regulation of expression is critically important. In Police
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, the Supreme Court stated
that “above all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its
87
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”
Accordingly, “[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively
88
invalid.” Practically, this has resulted in the general rule that
content-based restrictions on speech must meet strict scrutiny,
while content-neutral regulations only need meet intermediate
89
scrutiny.
However, an exception to this bright line was created in
Young v. American Mini Theatres where it was established that
regulations that are facially content-based are to be classified
as content-neutral for purposes of judicial scrutiny if they are
not aimed at the communicative effect of the speech, but rather
90
In Young, the legitimate concern
at its secondary effects.
about the secondary effects on a neighborhood resulting from
the presence of an adult theater was sufficient for the content
based regulations to be considered content neutral when
91
applying judicial scrutiny.
C. RECENT RESTRICTIONS ON HYPERLINKING
Recently, Congress has placed restrictions on hyperlinking.
For example, although the Methamphetamine AntiProliferation Act ultimately failed, legislation aimed at curbing
dissemination of information about making bombs, worded in
92
substantially the same manner as the methamphetamine
87. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
88. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
89. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed. Communication Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622,
642 (1994). “Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to
regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon
speech because of its content.” Id. “In contrast, regulations that are unrelated
to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.” Id.
90. See Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 84 (1976) (Powell,
J., concurring); id. at 70-72 (Stevens, J., holding unclear).
91. See id.
92. The wording of the relevant provision of the Methamphetamine AntiProliferation Act provided that it is unlawful
to teach or demonstrate to any person the manufacture of a
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legislation, was signed into law on September 8th, 1999. Thus
hyperlinking to a website is banned to the extent that it
constitutes distributing information pertaining to the
manufacture or use of an explosive with knowledge that the
information receiver will use the information to violate federal
law.
The courts have also recently placed restrictions on
hyperlinking.
In Intellectual Reserve v. Utah Lighthouse
94
Ministry, defendant was banned from providing links to web
sites that posted copies of a copyrighted church handbook.
Defendant was previously enjoined from posting the handbook
online but sought to get around the effect of that injunction by
stating on their web site that the handbook was still available
and providing links to three web sites where the handbook
95
could be viewed. The court found that the links amounted to
contributory infringement and briefly dismissed any First
Amendment concerns holding that “the First Amendment does
not give defendants the right to infringe on legally recognized
96
rights under the copyright law.”
Another recent case provided a First Amendment analysis,
in more depth though not more satisfying. In Universal City
97
Studios v. Reimerdes, the website 2600.com was inter alia
controlled substance, or to distribute to any person, by any means,
information pertaining to, in whole or in part, the manufacture or use
of a controlled substance, knowing that such person intends to use
the teaching, demonstration, or information for, or in furtherance of,
an activity that constitutes a Federal crime.
H.R. 2987, 106th Cong., Section 5 §421 (a) (2) (B) (1999). Whereas, the
relevant portion of 18 USC §842 provides that
to teach or demonstrate to any person the making or use of an
explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction, or to
distribute to any person, by any means, information pertaining to, in
whole or in part, the manufacture or use of an explosive, destructive
device, or weapon of mass destruction, knowing that such person
intends to use the teaching, demonstration, or information for, or in
furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal crime of
violence.
18 USC §842 (p) (2) (B).
93. See 145 CONG. REC. D953.
94. See Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75
F.Supp. 2d 1290, 1295 (D.Utah 1999).
95. See id. at 1294-95.
96. Id. at 1295.
97. The website 2600.com is run by Eric Corley, who is “viewed as a
leader of the computer hacker community.” Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d 294,308 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). He and his company,
2600 Enterprises, Inc., publish a magazine called 2600: The Hacker Quarterly.
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enjoined from using hyperlinks to websites that posted
98
DeCSS , computer code capable of cracking the encryption
99
system which prevents DVD disks from being copied.
Interming the hyperlinks “the practical equivalent of making
100
DeCSS available on their own web site” the court held that
since hyperlinks have both functional and expressive elements
that the appropriate standard for First Amendment concerns
101
was the O’Brien test.
Computer code is expressive. To that extent, it is a matter
of First Amendment concern. But computer code is not purely
expressive any more than the assassination of a political figure
is purely a political statement. Code causes computers to
perform desired functions. Its expressive element no more
immunizes its functional aspects from regulation than the
expressive motives of an assassin immunize the assassin’s
102
action.
The court went on to articulate that although “[l]inks bear
a relationship to the information superhighway comparable to
the relationship that roadway signs bear to roads,” links are
different because they are more functional by taking one almost
instantaneously to the desired destination upon the user
103
Thus, the functionality with links, in
clicking their mouse.
the court’s view, is that they take the user to the destination
104
“with the mere click of an electronic mouse.”
See id. The Hacker Quarterly has included articles on such topics as how to
steal an Internet domain name, access other people’s e-mail, intercept cellular
phone calls, break into the computer systems at Costco stores and Federal
Express, as well as a guide to the federal criminal justice system for readers
charged with computer hacking. See id. at 308-309.
98. CSS, or Content Scramble System, is an encryption system used by
motion picture studios to control access to and prevent copying of their motion
pictures stored on DVD discs. See id. at 308. CSS requires the use of
appropriately configured hardware such as a DVD player or a computer DVD
drive to decrypt, unscramble and play back motion pictures on DVDs. See id.
DeCSS is a software utility, or computer program, that enables users to break
the CSS copy protection system and thereby view DVDs on unlicensed players
and make digital copies of DVD movies. See id. DeCSS was created by a
Norwegian national, Jon Johansen, in September 1999, after he discovered the
CSS encryption algorithm and keys. See id. at 311. Mr. Johansen posted the
executable code on his personal Internet web site and spread word of its
availability. See id.
99. See id. at 326.
100. Id. at 324.
101. See id. at 339.
102. See id. at 304.
103. Id. at 339.
104. Id.
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In applying O’Brien, the court held that the DMCA served
a substantial governmental interest, that the regulation was
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and that
regulation “promotes a substantial government interest that
105
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.”
In
deciding the third prong of the O’Brien test the court held that
although it would be more direct to simply go after the posting
sites themselves, that limiting a remedy to sites posting the
material would achieve the government interest less effectively
because of foreign sites that not subject to the DMCA and no
106
However, the Court qualified the scope
subject to suit here.
of the injunction stating that,
there may be no injunction against, nor liability for, linking
to a site containing circumvention technology, the offering of
which is unlawful under the DMCA, absent clear and
convincing evidence that those responsible for the link (a) know
at the relevant time that the offending material is on the
linked-to site, (b) know that it is circumvention technology that
may not lawfully be offered, and (c) create or maintain the link
107
for the purpose of disseminating that technology.
So far, Reimerdes has been the only case in which the
federal judiciary has analyzed, in detail, the First Amendment
implications of regulating hyperlinks. As such, the analysis in
Reimerdes will be focused upon. However, this issue is likely to
come up again under the DMCA as well as other laws that inter
alia regulate hyperlinks, depending on interpretation. As such,
First Amendment protection of hyperlinking is likely to be
important in the future and therefore analysis of the
appropriate standard of review is relevant.
II. ANALYSIS
A. CONDUCT, FUNCTIONALITY, AND EXPRESSION
To begin, one must understand that no speech is ever truly
pure; it is always accompanied by conduct or non-speech
108
elements that make the speech possible.
The Ninth Circuit

105. Id.
106. See id. at 340.
107. Id. at 341.
108. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S.
284, 296 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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has recognized that at some level all speech is conduct because
“speech in any language consists of the ‘expressive conduct’ of
vibrating one’s vocal chords, moving one’s mouth and thereby
making sounds, or of putting pen to paper, or hand to
109
keyboard.”
Accordingly, when looking for what qualifies
something as properly categorized as expressive conduct for
First Amendment analysis, we must look further than some
simple element of conduct.
Some conduct accompanying speech may be burdensome to
others. For example, talk may be noisy, or the distribution of
110
When these burdensome “nonleaflets may cause litter.
speech” elements accompanying expression rise past a certain
threshold level, the Court labels the activity expressive conduct
and gives the expression a lower level of First Amendment
111
In some instances, we accept this because the
protection.
harm in suppressing the non-speech elements and
accompanying expression is less than the harm of letting the
112
Thus, sometimes suppressing
non-speech elements happen.
the expression is the lesser of two evils.
However, the practical reality is that away from extreme
examples it becomes very difficult to draw a distinction
between what is properly considered pure speech and what is
properly considered expressive conduct. The distinction has
113
been termed both a “hazy line” and “too crude to identify
114
those communicative acts which deserve special protection.”

109. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 934 (9th Cir.
1995) (en banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996), vacated on other grounds
and remanded sub nom Arizonians for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct.
1055 (1997), vacated and remanded, 118 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 1997).
110. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 827 (2nd
ed. 1988).
111. An extreme example given by the court in Reimerdes of expression
rising to the level of proscribable conduct is the assassination of a political
figure. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294,
304 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
At that level, the non-speech element has
unquestionably gone far beyond the threshold necessary to apply a lesser
standard of free speech protection, such as under the doctrine of expressive
conduct. See id. at 328 (by implication).
112. See SADURSKI, supra note 45, at 38. The calculus is not quite as
simple as saying that any net surplus of benefits justifies restriction. One
commentator has stated that the calculus would only be that simple in the
case of a lenient scrutiny standard. See id. Whereas in the case of strict
scrutiny, the social good resulting must be of great importance. See id. at 3839.
113. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982).
114. SADURSKI, supra note 45, at 44.
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This is particularly true in the realm of the new communication
medium known as cyberspace. Commentators have noted that
“there are signs of increasing difficulty in distinguishing speech
115
from conduct on the Internet.”
The inherent difficulty in
drawing this line was evident in the court’s analysis in
Reimerdes.
B. EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT: AN INAPPROPRIATE DOCTRINE
FOR HYPERLINKING
1. The Nature of Hyperlinks
The court in Reimerdes fundamentally misunderstood the
nature of hyperlinks. In analogizing, the court found that
hyperlinks are different than roadway signs because “they take
one almost instantaneously to the desired destination with the
116
mere click of an electronic mouse.”
Strictly speaking,
117
however, the court used the term “take” inappropriately.
Hyperlinks themselves do not actually “take” the user
anywhere, not like a bus “takes” a rider to another
118
This wording by the court shows a
destination.
misunderstanding of the nature of hyperlinks. Hyperlinks
merely provide an address to the user’s browser program. Then
if the user clicks on the hyperlink the user’s browser program
requests information from the server at the particular
119
While this point may seem to be a minor issue of
address.
semantics, it is critical to understanding the flaw in the court’s
analysis. To say that a hyperlink “takes” a user to a location,
as the court did, is to expand the non-speech element of a
hyperlink and thereby make the drawing of the hazy line even
115. Daniel A. Farber, Expressive Commerce in Cyberspace: Public Goods,
Network Effects, and Free Speech, 16 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 789, 796 (2000)
(discussing how conventional economic regulations may begin to pose First
Amendment issues when applied to cyberspace activities such as economically
valuable information transmissions termed expressive commodities).
116. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 339
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
117. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1201 (10th ed.
1995) ("[T]ake", in this sense means to lead, “carry, or cause to go along to
another place,” for example “this bus will [take] you into town.”).
118. See id.
119. After clicking on a hypertext link, “the user’s browser or other
application can then retrieve the material from its location.” See supra note
40 and accompanying text.
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more error prone. Whereas, to say that a hyperlink merely
provides a server address in a form the browser can understand
keeps hyperlinks away from the line at which pure expression
turns into expressive conduct.
When properly understood, hyperlinks can be thought of as
120
tantamount to electrified footnotes.
The only difference is
that hyperlinks make it somewhat easier for the reader to find
and view the reference material. It is unlikely that any court
would find that the non-expressive, functional elements present
in traditional footnotes would qualify them to be considered
expressive conduct and thus analyzed under the O’Brien test.
Therefore, it does not make sense to apply the O’Brien test to
what are essentially footnotes in a modern medium of
communication.
2. Hyperlinks Distinguished From Source Code
Next, the court in Reimerdes improperly relied on the
analysis of Junger v. Daley to bolster its position of hyperlinks
121
In one sense
being evaluated under the O’Brien standard.
the court was right. The logic of the Sixth Circuit could be
applied to the DeCSS code itself. Like the encryption source
code of Junger, the DeCSS code communicated information and
ideas about computer programming but also had a functional
capability; it cracked the CSS encryption system in direct
122
However, where the court went
violation of the DMCA.
wrong is that computer source code is distinguishable from
hyperlinks and thus applying the same Junger source code
analysis to hyperlinks is entirely inappropriate. Computer
source code is typically made up of a high-level computer
language that is then compiled into machine-readable object
123
code that the machine can execute to perform specific tasks.
The expressive nature of source code lies only in the ability of
trained programmers to extract from the code ideas about its

120. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
121. See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 at 339. Following the logic of
Junger, the court found that links, like computer code in general, have both
expressive and functional elements and “are within the area of First
Amendment concern.” Id. Therefore, the court found that the constitutionality
of suppression of linking is determined by the same O’Brien standard applied
to the DeCSS source code. See id.
122. See id. at 303.
123. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 116 (2000).
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nature and function.
Practically, though, source code is
125
incomprehensible to the majority of people.
Accordingly,
source code’s value as a speech medium is limited.
Conversely, the value of hyperlinks as a component of a
new speech medium is great. Hyperlinks are one of the most
distinguishing and valuable features of the medium that has
been deemed “a perfect means for freely expressing one’s
126
It becomes clear that there is a much greater free
opinion.”
speech interest in hyperlinks than there is in source code and
thus First Amendment reasoning developed for source code
should not be glibly applied to hyperlinks. Rather, a different
analysis must be applied to hyperlinks in respect of its greater
free speech stature.
Moreover, there are deeply disturbing potential
consequences of not recognizing the distinction between source
code and hyperlinks. Not distinguishing the two is recognizing
the many different ways in which computer code is used in the
digital age. Specifically, there is a distinction to be drawn
between functionality that is an important part of
communication and functionality that merely exists along with
communication. Were it not so, the Junger logic could be
applied to almost all modern communication media, weakening
all First Amendment protection. For example, documents
created in word processors exist in computer memory as
machine-readable coded data files. These electronic documents
contain a functional aspect in that they tell the computer what
words to display when a wording-processing program loads a
document file. According to the analysis used by the court in
Reimerdes, then, because word processing documents exist as
computer code and have both functional and expressive
features they would only be protected under the medium
scrutiny O’Brien standard.
Clearly, no rational person would argue that word
processing documents are anything less than pure speech
despite the fact that they exist as computer code in the memory
of a computer and have functional elements. The distinction
between functionality that is an important part of
communication and functionality that merely exists along with
communication becomes clear in this context. Hyperlinks, like

124. See id. at 106.
125. See id.
126. GREWLICH, supra note 1, at 267.
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word processing documents, only have functionality for the
sake of enabling communication. So just as word processing
document files should not be treated as expressive conduct
merely because they have some functionality, hyperlinks
should not be treated as expressive conduct merely because
they have some functionality. The Junger precedent should not
be interpreted so that all computer code is treated the same.
The Junger precedent should be limited to source code and not
extended to hyperlinks.
3.

A Thought Experiment

A thought experiment gives perspective to the difficulty of
the court in recognizing hyperlinking as pure speech. Suppose
that the written word was unknown in our world and only oral
communication was used. Now imagine a new technology being
developed which offers great potential for its ability to improve
societal communication. Suppose that this new technology is
the written word and is rapidly adopted throughout society.
Imagine the challenge in applying the doctrine of expressive
conduct to the written word for the very first time. The
arguments that would be made both for and against mirror
those made in the application of the doctrine of expressive
conduct to hyperlinking.
First, proponents of applying expressive conduct to writing
would point out that unlike oral communication, writing
involves the physical conduct of using a pencil and making
marks on paper. Second, they would say that a physical
embodiment of communication, where none previously existed,
is justifiably regulated at a different level than oral
communication because it could cause negative effects
previously unseen. Specifically, written communication, unlike
oral communication which is inherently limited to the earshot
of the speaker, can take on a life of its own by being distributed
far more widely than the speaker would themselves ever travel.
For these reasons, some in our thought experiment would
argue that expressive conduct is the appropriate doctrine for
regulating the written word.
Those against applying the doctrine of expressive conduct
to the written word would point out that there is new conduct
involved in writing but this conduct is merely in furtherance of
communication. Moreover, they would try to point out that
from a free speech perspective, there is no difference between
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oral and written communications, they both exist for the
purpose of transmitting ideas.
Stepping out of the thought experiment, it is important for
the courts to realize that the question of whether to apply the
doctrine of expressive conduct to hyperlinks is incredibly close
to the situation presented in the thought experiment. Today, it
is beyond question that written and oral communications
should be treated the same for free speech purposes. This is
understood by all because of the intimate familiarity that
everyone has with the written word. It is important to point
out, though, that not everyone has this same degree of
familiarity with communications on the Internet.
Some
members of society, including some on the bench, only see
negative aspects of the Internet as reported by the media
including virus outbreaks and commercial fraud. Therefore, it
is difficult for some to appreciate the Internet’s role, and more
specifically hyperlinks’ role, as the next biggest communication
revolution since the written word.
C. DIRECTIONS FOR THE COURT: WAITING FOR THE IDEAL TEST
CASE
The Reimerdes case was not an ideal evaluation of the free
speech nature of hyperlinking for two reasons. First, it would
seem that the defendants suspect status as “hackers” made the
determination of the “hazy line” between speech and conduct
even hazier. Second, the copyright implications involved in this
case made it a less than ideal fact set because the historical
relationship between copyright and the First Amendment.
Elements of the Reimerdes court’s opinion would seem to
point towards picking a conclusion first and then finding
reasons to support it. Admittedly, the defendant’s own conduct
is largely the reason for this. In a move termed by the
defendant as “electronic civil disobedience”, the defendant
made an effort to link to as many websites offering the DeCSS
127
Understandably this would dispose the
code as possible.
court to reaching a decision against them.
Other aspects of the courts decision also suggest a
predisposition against the defendant.
In an extreme
comparison that may reveal its leanings the Reimerdes court
127. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294,
303-304 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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held that the expressive element of computer code “no more
immunizes its functional aspects from regulation than the
expressive motives of an assassin immunize the assassin’s
128
action.” Also, the court pointed out that computer viruses are
also computer code and held that “society must be able to
regulate the use and dissemination of code in appropriate
129
To this extent, the court held that the
circumstances.”
130
Constitution is not “a suicide pact.” Finally, in describing the
defendant and his background, the court noted that the
defendant publishes what is regarded as “a bible to the hacker
131
In describing the content of the defendant’s
community.”
magazine the court held that “[n]ot surprisingly, 2600: The
Hacker Quarterly has included articles on such topics as how to
steal an Internet domain name, access other people’s e-mail,
intercept cellular phone calls, and break into the computer
132
systems at Costco stores and Federal Express.” Further, that
“[o]ne issue contains a guide to the federal criminal justice
133
system for readers charged with computer hacking.”
These points brought up by the court reveal its
predisposition and contributed to the making of bad law. A
finding that hyperlinking is pure speech would simply not be
equivalent to a “suicide pact”, as suggested by the court.
Moreover, the inflammatory comparison by the court of
hyperlinking to political assassination is unfair and displays
prejudice. Further, it is true that computer viruses are a
menace and society should be able to regulate their use as the
court suggests. However, this is more of a reason to view
different types of code differently rather than a reason to deny
the pure speech nature of hyperlinking. While the negative
image that the court apparently had of the defendant is
probably well deserved, it is unfortunate that it likely affected
the calculus of the court’s decision.
The second aspect of the Reimerdes case that makes it less
than ideal as a model for determining the free speech nature of
hyperlinking is that it involved copyright. Where copyright
infringement is concerned, the courts have historically

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 304.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 308-309.
Id. at 309.
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dismissed free speech arguments.
To the extent that the
Reimerdes court did not dismiss such arguments so quickly it
should be applauded. This has not been true in other cases
135
Regardless, the ideal fact set
such as the Utah Reserve case.
for determining the free speech nature of hyperlinking would
not involve copyright. As this type of ideal case is bound to
arise soon, a discussion of what options the court would have
for analysis is appropriate.
While the doctrine of expressive conduct is not properly
applied to hyperlinks, this does not mean that only strict
scrutiny will be applied to all regulation of hyperlinks. As
applicable to other types of pure speech, the court can use other
judicial doctrines to balance the free speech interests of
hyperlinking with the potential harm that may be caused. For
example, the doctrine of advocacy of illegal conduct might be
applied to curtail some particularly egregious hyperlinking
comparable to the situation discussed in Rice v. Paladin
136
Alternately, some restrictions of hyperlinking
Enterprises.
may not be viewed as being content-based or might fall under
the secondary effects exception.
In sum, arguing that
hyperlinks should not be treated as expressive conduct is not
taking an extremist First Amendment position because there
are other doctrines under which judicial scrutiny might be
lessened. Rather, arguing that hyperlinks should not be
treated as expressive conduct is simply realizing that
hyperlinks are a new form of pure speech.
III. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment doctrine of expressive conduct is not
appropriately applied to hyperlinks. The limited amount of
functionality in hyperlinks exists for the sake of communication
and not in addition to the communication. Further, this
134. See e.g. Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc.,
75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1295 (D.Utah 1999) (“[T]he First Amendment does not
give defendants the right to infringe on legally recognized rights under the
copyright law.”). “Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, few courts have upheld the argument
that copyright law might be limited by the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.” Stephen Fraser, The Conflict Between the First Amendment
and Copyright Law and its Impact on the Internet, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 1, 1 (1998).
135. See Intellectual Reserve, supra note 134.
136. See supra Part I.B.3.
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limited functionality is not enough to cross the line into
expressive conduct.
To hold otherwise, as the court in
Reimerdes did, jeopardizes First Amendment protection for all
communication that is enabled by modern technology.
Ultimately, the courts must be careful when deciding “just
what the First Amendment should mean in cyberspace” so that
137
they don’t “get it fundamentally wrong.”

137. LIPSCHULTZ, supra note 10, at 2.

